In this paper we study a type of games regularized by the relative entropy, where the players' strategies are coupled through a random environment variable. Besides the existence and the uniqueness of equilibria of such games, we prove that the marginal laws of the corresponding mean-field Langevin systems can converge towards the games' equilibria in different settings. As applications, the dynamic games can be treated as games on a random environment when one treats the time horizon as the environment. In practice, our results can be applied to analysing the stochastic gradient descent algorithm for deep neural networks in the context of supervised learning as well as for the generative adversarial networks.
is linear. In this paper we shall allow the potential function to be nonlinear in view of the applications, in particular, to the neural networks (see Section 4) . As another generalization to the classic theory, we consider games on a random environment. Introduce a space of environment Y and fix a probability measure m on it. We urge each player to choose a strategy among the probability measures ν i on the product space R n i × Y such that the marginal law of ν i on Y, ν i Y , matches the fixed distribution m. Typically, in our framework we consider the game of which the Nash equilibrium is a collection of probability measures (ν * ,i ) i=1,··· ,n on the product spaces such that ν * ,i ∈ argmin
where ν(·|y) denotes the conditional probability given y, and we add the relative entropy H as a regularizer. In contrast to the conventional definition of the Nash equilibrium (1.1), where the players' strategies are uncorrelated, in our setting the strategies of the players are allowed to be coupled through the environment. Moreover, the general framework of the present paper goes beyond the particular game (1.2), by allowing the cost function to be nonlinear in (ν i ) i=1,··· ,n .
As an application, we observe (Example 2.4) that relaxed dynamic games can be viewed as games on random environment, where the environment Y is the time horizon. One of our main contributions is the first order condition of the optimization on the probability space given a marginal constraint (Theorem 3.1), which naturally provides a necessary condition for being a Nash equilibrium of a game on random environment (Corollary 3.3). This result is a generalization to the first order condition in Proposition 2.4 in [18] for the optimization on the probability space without marginal constraint. The key ingredient for this analysis is the linear functional derivative δF δν , first introduced for the variational calculus and recently popularized by the study on the mean-field games, see e.g. Cardaliaguet et al. [1] , Delarue et al. [9, 10] , Chassagneux et al. [6] . Roughly speaking, we prove that if ν * ∈ argmin ν:ν Y =m F (ν) + σ 2 2 H(ν|Leb × m), then ∇ x δF δν (ν * , x, y) + σ 2 2 ∇ x ln ν * (x|y) = 0, for all x, m-a.s. y. (1.3)
Besides the first order condition for the Nash equilibrium, we also provide sufficient conditions on the linear functional derivative so that the game on a random environment admits a (unique) equilibrium. The first order equation in (1. 3) clearly links the minimizer ν * (or the Nash equilibrium in the context of games) to the invariant measure of a system of diffusion processes, see (2.2) below. Since the dynamics of the diffusion processes depends on their marginal distributions (in other word, McKean-Vlasov diffusion, see [24, 27] ) and involves the gradients of the potential functions, we name the system mean-field Langevin (MFL) system. Further, we study the different settings where the marginal laws of the MFL system converge to the unique invariant measure, which, due to the first order condition, must coincide with the Nash equilibrium of the game on random environment. We remark that in order to fit a wider class of applications (in particular those related to neural networks), we are interested in the MFL systems of which the coefficients are not necessarily convex in the state variable (as in [3, 4] ) and do not necessarily have non-small dependence on the marginal laws. The non-small mean-field dependence is a common technical constraint in the previous studies on the (exponential) ergodicity of McKean-Vlasov diffusions, see e.g. [12, 13] . One important contribution of this paper is to get around this constraint and prove the exponential ergodicity by introducing a structural condition on the dependence of the marginal laws (see Theorem 3.12) . This approach is original to our knowledge. In the special case of one-player game (in other word, optimization), once the potential function is convex, we use an argument, similar to that in [17, 18] , based on the Lasalle's invariant principle to prove the (non-exponential) ergodicity of the MFL system under quite mild conditions on the coefficients.
In view of applications, our result can be used to justify the applicability of the gradient descent algorithm for training (deep) neural networks. As mentioned in [17, 18, 22, 23] , the supervised learning with (deep) neural networks can be viewed as a minimization problem (or optimal control problem in the context of deep learning) on the space of probability measures, and the gradient descent algorithm is approximately a discretization of the corresponding meanfield Langevin dynamics. The present paper provides a more general framework for such studies. In particular, it is remarkable that in Section 4 we provide a theoretically convergent numerical scheme for the generative adversarial networks (GAN) as well as a way to characterize the training error.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the definitions of a game on a random environment and the corresponding MFL system. In Section 3 the main theorems of the paper are stated without proofs. In Section 4 we present the applications to the dynamic games and the GAN. Finally in Section 5 we present the proofs of the main theorems.
Notation and definitions 2.1 Preliminary
Denote by Y the space of environment, and assume Y to be Polish. Throughout the paper, we fix a probability measure m on Y. Define the product spaceR d := R d ×Y for d ∈ N. In this paper we consider a game in which the players choose strategies among Π :
We will refer to δF δν as the linear functional derivative. There is at most one δF δν , modulo a constant, satisfying (2.1).
Here is the basic assumption we apply throughout the paper.
Assumption 2.1 (basic assumption). Assume that for some p ≥ 1, the function F : Π → R belongs to C 1 and
• F is W p -continuous, where W p stands for the p-Wasserstein distance;
Remark 2.2. Since in our setting the law on the environment Y is fixed, by disintegration we may identify a distributionπ ∈ Π with the probability measures π(·|y) y∈Y ⊂ P p (R d ) such that π(dx) = π(dx|y)m(dy).
Game on random environment
In this paper, we consider a particular game in which the strategies of the n players are correlated through the random environment (or signal) Y. Let n i ∈ N for i = 1, · · · , n and N := n i=1 n i . As mentioned before, the i-th player chooses his strategy (a probability measure) among Π i := {ν ∈ P p (R n i ) : ν(R n i , ·) = m}, while the joint distribution of the other players' strategies belongs to the space Π −i := {ν ∈ P p (R N −n i ) : ν(R N −n i , ·) = m}. The i-th player aims at optimizing his objective function F i : Π i × Π −i → R. More precisely, he faces the optimization:
In this paper, we are more interested in solving a regularized version of the game above. We use the relative entropy with respect to Leb n i × m, denoted by H i , as the regularizer. Namely, given µ ∈ Π −i the i-th player solves:
Forπ ∈ Π, we denote byπ i ∈ Π i its marginal distribution onR n i , and byπ −i ∈ Π −i the marginal distribution onR N −n i .
Example 2.4. To have a concrete example of games on random environment, we refer to the dynamic games, both discrete-time and continuous-time models. In the discrete-time case, let Y := {1, · · · , T } for some T ∈ N and m be the uniform distribution on Y. Define the controlled dynamics:
If the n players minimize the objective functions of the form f i (Θ i y ) y∈Y by choosing the strategȳ π i , then the game fits the framework of this paper.
Similarly for the continuous-time model, consider the space Y := [0, T ] for T ∈ R and let m be the uniform distribution on the interval. Define the continuous-time dynamics: dΘ i y = ϕ i π i (·|y),π −i , Θ i y , y dy, whereπ i (·, dy) = π i (·|y)m(dy), for y ∈ Y.
If the n players minimize the objective functions of the form f i (Θ i y ) y∈Y by choosing the strategȳ π i , then this game also fits in the framework discussed above.
Mean-field Langevin system
For any fixed µ ∈ Π −i , we assume that
In order to compute Nash equilibria of the game on random environment, we are interested in the following mean-field Langevin (MFL) dynamics:
where W = (W i ) i is an N -dimension Brownian motion, Y is a random variable taking values in Y and satisfying the law m, andπ t := LawX t withX t := (X 1 t , · · · , X n t , Y ). In this paper we will discuss the relation between the MFL dynamics and the Nash equilibrium of the game on the random environment.
Remark 2.5. Here are some important observations:
• The random variable Y plays the role of parameter in the MFL system. This leads us to study the system:
Formally, the marginal laws of the MFL system above with a fixed y ∈ Y satisfy the following system of Fokker-Planck equations:
• For fixed y ∈ Y, the dynamic systems for X i (y) i are only weakly coupled through the marginal distributions.
• Although we name the system after Langevin, the drift term of the dynamics of the aggregated vector (X i ) i=1,··· ,n is in general not in the form of the gradient of a potential function.
3 Main results
Optimization with marginal constraint
One of our observations is the following first order condition of the optimization over the probability measures with marginal constraint. Conversely, if we additionally assume that F is convex, thenπ * ∈ Π satisfying (3.1) implies π * ∈ argminπ ∈Π V (π).
Remark 3.2. We remark that
• the regularizer H(π) plays an important role for the proof of the necessary condition. Without it, forπ * ∈ argminπ ∈Π V (π) we can only conclude that there is a measurable function f : Y → R such that δF δπ (π * , x, y) = f (y),π * -a.s.;
• for the readers more interested in the minimization of the unregularized potential function F , by standard argument (see e.g. [18, Proposition 2.3]) one may prove that under mild conditions the minimum of F + ηH converges to the minimum of F as η → 0.
Equilibria of games on random environment
Applying the first order condition above to the context of the game on random environment, we immediately obtain the following necessary condition for the Nash equilibria.
Corollary 3.3 (Necessary condition for Nash equilibria). For i = 1, · · · , n and µ ∈ Π −i , let
Ifπ ∈ Π is a Nash equilibrium, we have for i = 1, · · · , n,
We shall use the first order equation (3.2) to show the following sufficient condition for the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium. 
We have the following results:
(i) for n = 1, if a function F satisfies the monotonicity condition then it is convex on Π.
Conversely, if F is convex and satisfies Assumption 2.1, then F satisfies the monotonicity condition.
(ii) in general (n ≥ 1), for i = 1, · · · , n and any µ ∈
,··· ,n satisfy the monotonicity condition. Then for any two Nash equilibriaπ * ,π * ∈ Π we have (π * ) i = (π * ) i for all i = 1, · · · , n.
Remark 3.5. Similar monotonicity conditions are common assumptions to ensure the uniqueness of equilibrium in the game theory, in particular in the literature of mean-field games, see e.g. [20] .
As for the existence of Nash equilibria, we obtain the following result following the classical argument based on the fixed point theorem.
Theorem 3.6 (Existence of equilibria). Assume that for i = 1, · · · , n, and µ ∈ Π −i (i) the set argmin ν∈Π i V i (ν, µ) is non-empty and convex;
Then there exists at least one Nash equilibriumπ * ∈ Π for the game on random environment.
Remark 3.7. There are various sufficient conditions so that the set argmin ν∈Π i V i (ν, µ) is convex, for example, the function ν → V i (ν, µ) is quasi-convex, or V i (ν, µ) has a unique minimizer.
That is why we leave the assumption (i) in the abstract form.
Invariant measure of the MFL system
In view of the Fokker-Planck equation (2.4), the first order equation (3.2) appears to be a sufficient condition forπ being an invariant measure of the MFL system (2.2). That is why we consider the MFL dynamics as a reasonable tool to compute the Nash equilibria of the game on random environment. The following Theorem 3.8 suggests that proving the existence of Nash equilibria and the uniqueness of the invariant measure, we can establish the equivalence between the invariant measure of (2.2) and one Nash equilibrium. While the existence of Nash equilibria has been discussed in Theorem 3.6, the uniqueness of invariant measure of mean-field dynamics is more complicated and is indeed a long-standing problem in probability and analysis. We are going to use the coupling argument in order to obtain the contraction result in Theorem 3.12.
Define the average Wasserstein distance:
and the spaces of flow of probability measures:
• for each i = 1, · · · , n, the function ∇ x i δF i δν is Lipschitz continuous in the following sense
and satisfies 
Note that when there is only one player, there is no such dependence.
(ii) The Lipschitz condition with respect to W p (ν, ν ) and W p (µ, µ ) can be replaced by the one with respect to W p (ν, ν ) and W p (µ, µ ). The latter is weaker. Under such assumption we cannot prove the particular case that the unique solution lies in C p ([0, T ], Π) for all T > 0 when C 0 = 0.
In the following analysis of the one-player problem it is crucial for us that the solution is in C p ([0, T ], Π), so we prefer to state the Lipschitz condition in its current form. 
where |O| := max x∈O |x|.
For a probability measure ν ∈ P(R N ) we define the image measure ν ψ := ν • ψ −1 , and for a probability measureπ ∈ P(R N ) we defineπ ψ (dx, dy) := π ψ (dx|y)m(dy). • for each i = 1, · · · , n, the function ∇ x i δF i δν is Lipschitz continuous in the following sense:
and (3.4) holds true;
• there is a continuous function κ : (0, +∞) → R s.t. lim sup r→+∞ κ(r) < 0, 1 0 rκ(r)dr < +∞ and for any (π, y) ∈ Π × Y we have for all x,
Letπ 0 ,π 0 ∈ P q (R d ) ∩ Π for some q > 1 be two initial distributions of the MFL system (2.2). Then we have
5)
where withκ(r) = κ(r) + 2γη(r) we define
In particular, there is a unique invariant measure in ∪ q>1 P q (R N ) ∩ Π.
Remark 3.13. The contraction result above resembles the one in Theorem 2.3 of [13] . We want to point out two major novelties:
(i) The dependence on the environment variable y is new, and that is why the contraction is under the metric W 1 .
(ii) In [12, 13] , concerned with the exponential ergodicity of McKean-Vlasov diffusion, one needs to assume the small dependence on the marginal laws, that is, the Lipschitz constant γ needs to be small enough. Here we get around the constraint by imposing the Lipschitz continuity with respect to the W 1 distance of the image measureπ ψ where the function ψ satisfies Assumption 3.10. This change allows wider applications of the contraction result.
Special case: one player
When the problem degenerates to the case of a single player, the MFL dynamics becomes a gradient flow and the function V = F + σ 2 2 H is a natural Lyapunov function for the dynamics. Let the assumption of Theorem 3.8 hold true, and further assume that
• there is ε > 0 such that for allπ ∈ Π and y ∈ Y
x · ∇ x δF δν (π, x, y) ≥ ε|x| 2 , for |x| big enough;
(3.6)
• for allπ ∈ Π and y ∈ Y, the mapping x → ∇ x δF δν (π, x, y) belongs to C 3 ;
• for all y ∈ Y, the function (π, x) → ∇ x δF δν (π, x, y), ∇ 2
x δF δν (π, x, y) are jointly continuous.
Then we have for s > s > 0
Using an argument, similar to that in [17, 18] , based on the Lasalle's invariant principle, we can show the following theorem.
Theorem 3.15. Consider the following statements: where H(·|Leb) is the relative entropy with respect to the Lebesgue measure. If we view the variable y as the index of the 'players', (3.9) indicates that allπ ∈ I are (mean-field) Nash equilibria of the game where the y-player aims at:
inf ν∈Π δF δν (π, x, y)ν(dx) + σ 2 2 H(ν|Leb) .
Corollary 3.17. If the function V is convex, the limit set I is a singleton and thus the marginal laws (π t ) t≥0 converge in W 2 to the minimizer of V .
Applications

Dynamic games and deep neural networks
As mentioned in Example 2.4, both discrete-time and continuous-time dynamic games can be viewed as games on the random environment. Take the continuous-time dynamic game as an example, in particular Y = [0, T ]. Consider the controlled process of the i-th player
and his objective function
Define the Hamiltonian function
It follows from a standard variational calculus that
where Θ i follows the dynamics (4.1) and P i is the solution to the linear ODE:
Therefore, according to Theorem 3.12, the Nash equilibrium of this dynamic game can be approximated by the marginal law of the MFL system. In case the number of players n = 1, the marginal laws of the MFL system approximates the minimizer of the optimization. There is a rising interest in modeling the forward propagation of the deep neural networks using a controlled dynamics and in connecting the deep learning to the optimal control problems, see e.g. [7, 8, 11, 21] . For the controlled processes in the particular form (4.1), we refer to Section 4 in [17] for the connection between the optimal control problem and the deep neural networks. In particular, we remark that the backward propagation algorithm is simply a discretization of the corresponding MFL dynamics.
Linear-convex zero-sum game and GAN
• δF δµ does not depend on µ;
• the function Φ : ν → max µ∈Π 2Ṽ (ν, µ) − σ 2 2 H(ν) is convex. If the Nash equilibrium exists, denoted byπ * , by the standard argument we have
It follows from Theorem 3.1 that µ * [ν] := argmax µ∈Π 2Ṽ (ν, µ) has the explicit density
where C(ν, y) is the normalization constant. Further, assume that the function Φ(ν) =Ṽ (ν, µ * [ν]) satisfies the assumption of Theorem 3.15 and recall that Φ is convex, it follows from Corollary 3.17 that we may approximate the minimizerπ * ,1 using the dynamics:
Compared to the dynamics (4.2), the dynamics (4.3) enjoys the natural Lyapunov functionṼ , i.e. t →Ṽ (π t ) decreases monotonically.
As an application, the generative adversarial networks (GAN) can be viewed as a linearconvex game. Given a bounded, continuous, non-constant activation function ϕ, consider the parametrized functions
as the options of the discriminators. The regularized GAN aims at computing the Nash equilibrium of the game:
Generator : sup µ∈P 2 (R n 1 )Ṽ (ν, µ)
whereμ ∈ P 2 (R n 1 ) is the distribution of interest. Indeed, in order to compute the Nash equilibrium of the game, one may rely on the MFL dynamics (4.2) and approximate its invariant measure. This approach is endorsed by Theorem 3.12. Here we present another approach, which exploits the particular structure of the linear-convex game. In particular, as discussed before, the optimizer of the generator given ν ∈ P 2 (R n 2 ) is explicit and has the density:
Further for the potential function Φ(ν) :
Then the strategy of the discriminator in the Nash equilibrium can be approximated by the MFL dynamics (4.3). In the perspective of numerical realization, note that the law µ * [ν] can be simulated by the MCMC algorithms such as Metropolis-Hastings.
In order to illustrate the advantage of the algorithm using the MFL dynamics (4.3), here we present the numerical result for a toy example. We are going to use the GAN to generate the samples of the exponential distribution with intensity 1. In this test, the optimal response of the generator, µ * [ν], is computed via Metropolis algorithm with Gaussian proposal distribution with zero mean and variance optimised according to [15] . The discriminator chooses parametrized functions among (4.4), where ϕ(X, z) = C(Az + b) + , with X = (C, A, b) .
When we numerically run the MFL dynamics (4.3) to train the discriminator, we use a 3000particle system, that is, the network is composed of 3000 neurones, and set its initial distribution to be standard Gaussian. The other parameters are chosen as follows: σ = 0.4, dt = 0.01, λ = 0.2. Figure 1 shows the training result after 60 iterations. In particular, we see that the training error decreases monotonically as suggested by our theoretical results.
Proofs
Optimization with marginal constraint
Proof of Theorem 3.1 Necessary condition Step 1. Letπ * ∈ Π be a minimizer of V .
Since H(π * ) < ∞, the probability measureπ * is absolutely continuous wrt Leb × m. Take any probability measureπ ∈ Π such that H(π) < ∞, in particularπ is also absolutely continuous wrt Leb × m. Denote the convex combination byπ ε := επ + (1 − ε)π * ∈ Π. Define the function h(z) := z ln z for z ∈ R + and h(0) = 0. Then 0 ≤ V (π ) − V (π * ) = F (π ) − F (π * ) + η h(π (x|y)) − h(π * (x|y)) ε dxm(dy) = 1 0 δF δπ (π λ ,x)(π −π * )(dx)dλ + η h(π (x|y)) − h(π * (x|y)) ε dxm(dy).
Since sup λ∈[0,ε] | δF δπ (π λ ,x)| ≤ C(1 + |x| p ) andπ,π * ∈ Π, by the dominated convergence theorem lim ε→0 1 0 δF δπ (π λ ,x)(π −π * )(dx)dλ = δF δπ (π * ,x)(π −π * )(dx).
Since the function h is convex, we have h(π (x|y))−h(π * (x|y)) ε ≤ h(π(x|y)) − h(π * (x|y)). Note that h(π(x|y)) − h(π * (x|y)) dxm(y) = H(π) − H(π * ) < ∞. By Fatou lemma, we obtain lim sup ε→0 h(π (x|y)) − h(π * (x|y)) ε dxm(dy) ≤ lim ε→0 h(π (x|y)) − h(π * (x|y)) ε dxm(dy) = ln π * (x|y)(π −π * )(dx).
Therefore we have 0 ≤ lim sup ε→0 V (π ) − V (π * ) ≤ δF δπ (π * ,x) + η ln π * (x|y) (π −π * )(dx). (5.1)
Step 2. We are going to show that for m-a.s. y Since dπ dπ * is bounded, we have thatπ ∈ Π and H(π) < ∞. In particular (5.1) holds true for thisπ. Also note that Ξ y ≤ c(y) − ε, π(·|y)-a.s. for y such that π * Ξ y ≤ c(y) − ε y ≥ ε . So we have 0 ≤ Therefore we conclude that π * Ξ y ≤ c(y) − ε y < ε for m-a.s. y. Since this is true for arbitrary ε , ε > 0, we obtain (5.2).
Step 3. We are going to show thatπ * is equivalent to Leb × m, so that Ξ y does not depend on x, Leb × m-a.s. and the first order equation (3.1) holds true. Suppose the opposite, i.e. there is a set K ∈R d such thatπ * (K) = 0 and Leb × m(K) > 0. In particular, ln π * (x|y) = −∞ on K. Denote K y := {x ∈ R d : (x, y) ∈ K}. We may assume that there exist K > ε > 0 such that Leb(K y ) ∈ [ε, K] for all y ∈ Y. Define a probability measureπ ∈ Π such that for all Borel-measurable A ⊂ R d π(A|y) := 1 2 π * (A|y) + 1 2Leb(K y ) A∩Ky dx.
It is easy to verify that H(π) < ∞, so (5.1) holds true and it implies 0 ≤ 1 2 K δF δπ (π * ,x) + η ln π * (x|y) π(dx) − 1 2 δF δπ (π * ,x) + η ln π * (x|y) π * (dx)
It is a contradiction, soπ * is equivalent to Leb × m.
Sufficient condition Assume that F is convex. Letπ * ∈ Π satisfy the first order equation (3.1), in particular,π * is equivalent to Leb × m. Take anyπ ∈ Π absolutely continuous wrt Leb × m (otherwise V (π) = +∞), and thus absolutely continuous wrt the measureπ * . Definē π := (1 − )π * + π for > 0. By the convexity of F we obtain
The last equality is due to the dominated convergence theorem. On the other hand, by convexity of the function h,
Hence V (π) − V (π * ) ≥ Rd δF δπ (π * , ·) + η ln π * (x|y) (π −π * )(dx) = 0, soπ * is a minimizer.
Equilibria of game
Proof of Corollary 3.4 (i) Let n = 1. Take three probability measuresπ,π ,π ∈ Π such thatπ = 1 2 (π +π ). Denoteπ λ := λπ + (1 − λ)π andπ λ := λπ + (1 − λ)π . By the definition of the linear derivative of F we obtain F (π ) − 2F (π) + F (π ) = 1 0 RN δF δν (π λ ,x)(π −π)(dx)dλ
Note thatπ −π =π −π = 1 2−2λ π λ −π λ . Therefore we have
Finally note that λ → (F (π λ ), F (π λ )) is continuous. So F satisfying the monotonicity condition must be convex on Π.
On the other hand, suppose F is convex on Π. Following a similar computation, we obtain
Letπ ,π ∈ Π. It follows from the dominated convergence theorem that
So F satisfies the monotonicity condition on Π.
(ii) Letπ * ∈ Π be a Nash equilibrium of the game. Then, by Corollary 3.3 we have that for every i there exists a function f i :
ln((π * ) i (x i |y)) = f i (y), for m-a.s. y.
Letπ * ,π * ∈ Π be Nash equilibriums. Then monotonicity condition (3.4) implies
because the marginal distributions ofπ * andπ * on Y coincide. The latter inequality can be rewritten
This is only possible if (π * ) i = (π * ) i for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof of Theorem 3.6 Forπ ∈ Π denote R i (π) := argmin ν∈Π i V i (ν,π −i ) for i = 1, · · · , n, and define R(π) := {π ∈ Π :π i ∈ R i (π) for i = 1, · · · , n}.
Step 1. First we prove that R(π) is W p -compact. For any ν i ∈ R i (π), it follows from the first order equation (3.1) that
where C(ν i ,π −i ) > 0 is the normalization constant so that ν i is a probability measure. Take a p > p. The condition (3.3) implies that C(ν i ,π −i ) is uniformly bounded as well as
So we have
Step 2. We are going to show that the graph ofπ ∈ E → R(π) is W p -closed, i.e. given π m ,π ∞ ∈ Π ∩ E,π m ∈ R(π m ) such thatπ m →π ∞ in W p andπ m →π ∞ ∈ Π, we want to show thatπ ∞ ∈ R(π ∞ ). Denote the concatenation of two probability measures
Note that forπ,π ∈ E we haveπ i ⊗π −i ∈ E. Since E is W p -compact, there is a subsequence, still denoted by (π m ,π m ), andπ * ∈ Π ∩ E such thatπ i m ⊗π −i m →π * in W p andπ * ,i =π i ∞ , π * ,−i =π −i ∞ . By the lower-semicontinuity of the mapping:π → V i (π i ,π −i ), we have
Further, fix ν i ∈ Π i ∩ E i . Again by the compactness of E, there is a subsequence, still denoted by (ν i ,π m ), andπ ν ∈ Π∩E such that
Together with (5.3), we conclude thatπ i ∞ ∈ R i (π ∞ ) for all i, and thusπ ∞ ∈ R(π ∞ ).
Step 3. From the condition of the theorem and the result of Step 1&2, we conclude that for anȳ π ∈ Π the set R(π) is non-empty, convex, that the set ∪π ∈Π R(π) is a subset of a W p -compact set, and that the graph of the mappingπ ∈ E → R(π) ⊂ E is W p -closed. Therefore, it follows from the Kakutani fixed-point theorem that the mappingπ → R(π) has a fixed point, which is a Nash equilibrium.
Further, since f ≤ 0 and rc(Σ y s ) = 1 whenever r s ≥ ε, we have
By taking expectation on both sides, we obtain
The second last inequality is due to Assumption 3.10, while the last one is due to (5.5) . Together with (5.7) and (5.8), we obtain
This holds true for all ε > 0, so finally we obtain (3.5). 
One player case
In particular, we have that (t, x) → π t (x|y) belongs to C 1,2 (0, ∞) × R N ) .
The following results can be proved with the same argument as in Lemma 5.5-5.7 in [17] , so the proof is omitted.
Lemma 5.2. Fix a y ∈ Y and assume E |X y 0 | 2 < ∞, where we recall the X y defined in (2.3). Denote by Q σ y the scaled Wiener measure 1 with initial distribution π 0 (·|y) and by (F t ) t≥0 the canonical filtration of the Wiener space. Then (i) for any finite horizon T > 0, the law of the solution to (2.2), Π(·|y) := Law(X y ), is equivalent to Q σ y on F T and the relative entropy
(ii) the marginal law π t (·|y) admits a density s.t. π t (·|y) > 0 and H π t (·|y) < +∞ for t > 0.
(iii) the function ln π t (x|y) is continuous differentiable in x for t > 0, and for any t 0 ∈ (0, t] it satisfies
where W t−t 0 s := W t−t 0 +s − W t−t 0 and W is the Brownian motion in (2.3). In particular, for any t * > 0 we have C := sup s≥t * R N ∇ x ln π s (x|y) 2 π s (x|y)dx < +∞, and C only depends on t * and the Lipschitz constant of ∇ x b y with respect to x.
(iv) we have the estimates R N |∇ x ln π t (x|y)|dx < +∞, R N |x · ∇ x ln π t (x|y)|dx < +∞ for all t > 0, and t t R N |∆ xx π s (x|y)|dxds < +∞ for all t > t > 0, and together with the integration by parts we obtain for all t > t > 0 R N ∆ xx δF δν (π t , x, y)π t (x|y)dx = − R N ∇ x δF δν (π t , x, y) · ∇ x π t (x|y)dx, (5.10) t t R N ∆ xx ln π s (x|y) π s (x|y)dxds = − t t R N |∇ x ln π s (x|y)| 2 π s (x|y)dxds. x δF δν (π t ,x)) π t (dx)dt
x) · ∇ x π t (x|y) π t (x|y) π t (dx)dt. (5.11) On the other hand, by Itô's formula and the Fokker-Planck equation (5.9), we have d log π t (X t |y) = σ 2 ∇ x · ∇ x π t (X t |y) π t (X t |y) + σ 2 2 ∇ x π t (X t |y) π t (X t |y)
where M is a martingale on [t, T ] for any 0 < t < T . By taking expectation on both sides and using (5.10), we obtain for t > 0:
dH(m t ) = E − σ 2 2 ∇ x π t (X t |y) π t (X t |y) 2 + ∇ x δF δν (π t , X t , y) · ∇ x π t (X t |y) π t (X t |y) dt = R N − σ 2 2 ∇ x π t (x|y) π t (x|y) 2 − ∇ x δF δν (π t , x, y) · ∇ x π t (x|y) π t (x|y) π(x)dt. (5.12) m). Together with the fact that F is W 2 -continuous, we have lim t→∞ V (π t ) = V (π * ). Further by the W 2 -lower-semicontinuity of V , we obtain V (π) ≤ lim t n →∞ V (π t n ) = V (π * ), for allπ ∈ ω(π 0 ).
Together with the optimality ofπ * , we have V (π) = V (π * ) for allπ ∈ ω(π 0 ). Finally by the invariant principle and (3.7), we conclude that ω(π 0 ) ⊂ I.
Step 2 (b). Similarly we can prove the result under the assumption (ii.b). Let (π tn ) n be a sequence converging toπ * in W 2 . Note that π * (x, y) = C exp − 2 σ 2 δF δν (π * , x, y) m(y)
is log-semiconcave due to the assumption. Due to the HWI inequality, we have lnπ tn (x|y) − lnπ * (x|y) π tn (dx) ≤ W 2 π tn ,π * I n + CW 2 π tn ,π * , where I n is the relative Fisher information defined as Again by Lemma 5.2 (iii) we have sup n I n < ∞. For the rest, we may follow the same lines of arguments in Step 2 (a) to conclude the proof.
